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“AGING OUT” OF IMMIGRATION:
ANALYZING FAMILY PREFERENCE VISA
PETITIONS UNDER THE CHILD STATUS
PROTECTION ACT
Christina A. Pryor*
In the late 1990s, extensive backlogs and delays by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services in processing family-based visa petitions caused
many children to “age out” of immigration eligibility and face separation
from their families. To rectify this problem, on August 6, 2002, Congress
enacted the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), which permits an applicant
to retain classification as a “child” for immigration purposes, even if he or
she has reached the age of twenty-one. The CSPA “freezes” the age of the
applicant through a mathematical formula that allows the time that a visa
petition was pending to be subtracted from his or her age.
In Matter of Wang, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) limited the
applicability of section 203(h)(3) of the CSPA to certain family-based visa
petitions. This Note focuses on the subsequent circuit split between the
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits over whether the BIA’s decision in Wang
should be given deference under the standard set forth in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Ultimately, this Note
endorses the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Cuellar de Osorio v.
Mayorkas. This Note contends that section 203(h)(3) is ambiguous under
the first prong of Chevron analysis. Applying Chevron’s second prong, this
Note argues that the BIA’s construction of the statute represents a
reasonable policy decision for the agency to make and thus merits
deference.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 5, 1998, Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio’s mother, a U.S. citizen,
filed an F3 1 family visa petition on her daughter’s behalf.2 Cuellar de
Osorio’s then-thirteen-year-old son was listed as a derivative beneficiary on
the petition, which made him eligible to immigrate with his mother.3 By
the time Cuellar de Osorio’s priority date became current4 seven years later,
1. See infra Part I.B.1.
2. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2011).
3. See id. at 958.
4. Due to the limited number of visas, a “waiting list” system based on the date an
individual’s petition is properly filed—referred to as the priority date—is used to determine
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on November 1, 2005, her son had “aged out” of derivative status. 5 At the
age of twenty-one, he was no longer considered a child under American
immigration law and could not accompany his mother to the United States.6
After Cuellar de Osorio became a legal permanent resident 7 (LPR) based
on her mother’s petition, she then filed a F2B visa petition (for adult sons or
daughters of LPRs) listing her son as a beneficiary. 8 She requested
retention of the original F3 petition’s priority date for the new F2B petition,
which would enable her son to immigrate years earlier than if he was
assigned a more recent priority date based on the F2B petition’s filing date.9
When U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied this
request, Cuellar de Osorio and other similarly situated plaintiffs filed suit
against the agency in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. 10
Immigrants such as Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio have brought federal
lawsuits alleging that USCIS has misinterpreted a provision of the Child
Status Protection Act of 2002 11 (CSPA) by refusing to grant age-out
protection for their alien 12 relatives. One immigration attorney has
estimated that 20,000 immigrants in the United States face separation from
their aged-out children. 13 Some immigrants, such as Cuellar de Osorio,
have left their adult children in their home countries after years of waiting
for visas because the children aged out of immigration eligibility. 14 In at
each visa petitioner’s place in line and to distribute the visas as they become available to the
next person in line. See Visa Availability & Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Green Card (Permanent
Residence)” hyperlink; then follow “Green Card Processes & Procedures” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 23, 2012). A priority date “becomes current” when a visa becomes available to
an immigrant, at which point he or she must submit a separate application in order to receive
the visa. See Baruelo v. Comfort, No. 05 C 6659, 2006 WL 3883311, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
29, 2006). For a detailed account of this process, see infra Part I.B.
5. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958.
6. See id.
7. An LPR is a person who has been granted lawful permanent residence in the United
States. See Randall Monger & James Yankay, U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2010, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/lpr_fr_2010.pdf. LPRs have the right to live and work anywhere in the United
States, own property, attend public educational institutions, enlist in certain branches of the
armed forces, and become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements. See id. LPRs are
commonly known as “green card holders,” a reference to the document a permanent resident
carries to provide proof of his or her status. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW 189 (Stephanie L. Browning ed., 2006). This card is officially known as
an I-551, and is no longer green. Id.
8. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006).
12. While the term “alien” has a pejorative connotation, this Note uses it because
virtually all federal government documents and legal opinions employ it to refer to foreignborn nationals who seek permanent residence in the United States. See ANNA O. LAW, THE
IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 1 n.1 (2010).
13. Immigrants Fight to Bring Adult Children to U.S., MSNBC (Aug. 25. 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32556526/ns/us_newslife/t/immigrants-fight-bring-adultchildren-us/.
14. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 955–56.
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least one case, however, the aged-out aliens are already within the United
States and face deportation proceedings. 15
The U.S. Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) interpretation of section 203(h)(3) of the
CSPA was correct in Matter of Wang, 16 which prohibited the retention of
visa priority dates for derivative beneficiaries of F2B, F3 and F4 visa
petitions. 17 Each of the three circuit courts to consider this statutory issue
thus far has based its analysis on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 18 evaluating whether deference to the BIA’s decision
is appropriate. The Second Circuit held that § 1153(h)(3), which codifies
section 203(h)(3) of the CSPA, is unambiguous, and that no relief is
available to aged-out aliens. The court reasoned that aged-out aliens cannot
retain their priority date if the visas cannot be converted to an appropriate
category. 19 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provision is
ambiguous, and courts must therefore defer to the BIA’s holding in Wang,
which the court determined was a permissible construction of the statute.20
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit considered the applicability of § 1153(h)(3),
and agreed with the Second Circuit that the provision is unambiguous.21
The court held, however, that the statute allows all beneficiaries and
derivative beneficiaries of family-based visa petitions to change petitioners
and obtain age-out protection under the CSPA. 22
This Note analyzes the recent treatment of § 1153(h)(3) in the circuit
courts following the BIA’s decision in Wang. It focuses on whether F2B,
F3, and F4 petitions are entitled to age-out protection under the CSPA.
This Note contends that courts should defer to the BIA’s interpretation of
§ 1153(h)(3) under Chevron. At Chevron Step One, 23 while the statute’s
plain language is clear, the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous
because its operation is not workable. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed
to Chevron Step Two. Because the BIA’s decision in Wang is based on a
permissible construction of the statute and is “a reasonable policy choice for
the agency to make,” 24 the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference.
Part I of this Note explains the complicated framework of the
immigration visa system, examines the enactment of the CSPA, and details
the scope of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, focusing on
administrative deference under Chevron. Part II describes the BIA’s
15. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2011).
16. 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (B.I.A. 2009).
17. See infra Part II.B. While the BIA’s decision expressly discusses F4 visa petitions,
in practice it excludes F2B and F3 petitions as well. See infra notes 180–84 and
accompanying text.
18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 382–85 (2d Cir. 2011).
20. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2011).
21. Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 2011).
22. Id. at 374–75.
23. In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step test to determine whether a
court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842–43; see infra Part I.D.2.
24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
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position on the CSPA “age out” problem in Wang, before considering the
three-way circuit split on the proper application of Chevron Step One
analysis. Part III first argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in
determining that the statutory language of the CSPA is ambiguous in
practice. It concludes that the BIA’s decision to limit § 1153(h)(3) to
derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions is reasonable and should therefore
be deferred to by courts.
I. THE “AGE OUT” PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
This part addresses the complex American immigration system and the
relevance of the Child Status Protection Act to reserving minor aliens’
places in the visa line. First, this part provides an overview of the actors
within the U.S. visa process and describes the mechanics of the distribution
of family-preference visas in particular. It then explores the CSPA,
considering the development of the bill, its legislative history, and the text
in detail. Finally, this part explains the theory underlying judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations, in particular the concept of Chevron
deference.
A. An Introduction to Immigration: The Immigration and Nationality Act
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Until the nineteenth century, state and local laws were the principal
sources of U.S. immigration regulation. 25 Federal immigration laws took a
piecemeal approach until 1952, when Congress enacted the Immigration
and Nationality Act,26 which combined all prior immigration laws into one
comprehensive statute.27 Although the INA has subsequently been
amended many times, it remains the foundation of immigration law. 28
Congress has broadly delegated the power to enforce federal immigration
provisions. 29 This administrative authority has been transferred among
numerous agencies over the past century. The Treasury Department
25. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW & POLICY 2 (5th ed. 2009); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 21–26 (2006) (describing
the shift from state to federal immigration regulation); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of
Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010)
(explaining how federal immigration laws only began to displace state laws following the
Civil War).
26. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).
27. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
& POLICY 173 (6th ed. 2008).
28. Id. at 176–81 (describing extensive reforms in 1965 and 1976, new provisions on
political asylum and refugees in 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the
Immigration Act of 1990, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Real ID Act); CHARLES
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.03(1) (2004) (“[The INA] is still the
basic statute dealing with immigration and nationality. The amendments have been fitted
into the structure of the parent statute . . . .”).
29. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 1.
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regulated federal immigration laws until 1903, at which point these
responsibilities shifted to the Department of Commerce and Labor.30 The
Department of Labor maintained control of immigration functions until
1940, when the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) moved to the
Department of Justice. 31 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, 32 which consolidated
federal agencies with various national-security-related functions. 33 This
legislation transferred the former responsibilities of the INS into three
immigration-related bureaus: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 34 Although the Act transferred the
enforcement and service entities of the INS to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice retained the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), which focuses on adjudication. 35
USCIS is responsible for the determination of immigration benefits such
as naturalization, overseas adoptions, work-related visas, and the
immigration of family members. 36 This Note focuses on USCIS’s power to
process Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative) for immigrants who are
outside of the United States, as well as Form I-485 (Adjustment of Status),
which must accompany Form I-130, for those aliens who are already in the
country. 37
B. The Visa Preference System
1. Immigration Categories and Quotas
To enter and remain in the United States lawfully, an alien must possess
a valid visa conferring immigrant or non-immigrant status. 38 Aliens
seeking permanent residence in the United States fall into one of four
primary categories: (1) immigrants who have certain relatives who are U.S.
citizens or LPRs (family-sponsored immigrants); (2) immigrants with
desirable job skills and certain other qualifications (employment-based
immigrants); (3) immigrants from countries with historically low
immigration rates to the United States (diversity immigrants); and (4) those

30. See ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 268–69.
31. See id. at 269.
32. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
33. ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 269.
34. See id. at 269–75. This Note uses “USCIS” to refer to both the INS prior to
March 1, 2003, when the Homeland Security Act took effect, and the current USCIS within
DHS.
35. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 5.
36. See What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “What We Do” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 23, 2012).
37. See Green Card-Based Forms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Forms” hyperlink; then follow “Green CardBased Forms” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)–(B) (2006).

2012]

“AGING OUT” OF IMMIGRATION

2205

with refugee or asylee status. 39 The family-sponsored immigration process
allows a U.S. citizen or LPR to file a Form I-130 petition on behalf of an
alien relative. 40 U.S. citizens may sponsor their immediate relatives, 41 who
are defined as spouses, parents, or unmarried children under the age of
twenty-one. 42 Such immediate relatives are exempt from the numeric limits
that apply to other permanent resident visas.43 For other qualifying
relatives of U.S. citizens, however, such as adult or married children, and
for all qualifying relatives of LPRs, the number of annual immigrant visas
is capped. 44
The Immigration Act of 1990 specifies an annual limit of 416,000 to
675,000 visas in the three preference categories: family-sponsored,
employment-based, and diversity. 45 Each of these three categories has its
own interior cap, and some categories are subject to per-country limits.46
Apart from immediate relatives of citizens, there are four family-sponsored
preference categories that must receive at least 226,000 immigrant visas
each year within the overall family-sponsored cap. 47 The INA establishes
the following family-based preference categories:
First Preference: unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
and their children (23,400 visas per year);
Second Preference: spouses and unmarried minor children of LPRs (2A)
and unmarried adult sons and daughters of LPRs (2B) (114,200 total for this
category plus any visas above the 226,000 minimum for the familysponsored preferences that are unused by immediate relatives of citizens; at
least seventy-seven percent of the second preference category must be
allocated to F2A visas);
Third Preference: married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (23,400);

39. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 253–54.
40. See § 1153(a).
41. §§ 1153(a), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i).
42. A “child” is defined under the INA as an unmarried person under the age of twentyone. After a child turns twenty-one, he or she is then considered a “son” or “daughter.”
§ 1101(b).
43. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
The admittance of immediate relatives has increased
significantly in recent decades, from nearly 80,000 in 1970 to over 480,000 in 2008. DAVID
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 143
(6th ed. 2011).
44. § 1153(a).
45. See § 1153(a), (c).
46. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 253.
47. § 1151(c). In order to calculate the quota for the family-sponsored preference
categories, the number of immediate relatives who immigrated in the previous fiscal year is
subtracted from the total allocation of 480,000. The number of unused employment-based
visas is then added to that amount. Id. Although this quota must be at least 226,000—due to
high levels of immigration by immediate relatives—it is unusual for it to surpass the
statutory minimum. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 43, at 153.

2206

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Fourth Preference: brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citizens (65,000). 48
These numbers represent the worldwide ceilings for the family-sponsored
preference program; however, this category is also subject to per-country
limits. 49 For purposes of those limits, an immigrant is “charged” to the
country in which he or she was born, with some exceptions. 50 In general,
the combined numbers of family-sponsored and employment-based
immigrants from a single country in each fiscal year may not exceed 7
percent of the combined worldwide limits for family-sponsored and
employment-based immigrants. 51 Immediate relatives and others exempt
from the worldwide limitations, as well as F2A immigrants, are also exempt
from per-country limitations. 52
Finally, the INA provides for the immigration of spouses and children
who are either “accompanying” or “following to join” the primary
immigrant under the same visa preference category. 53 These immigrants,
the spouses and children of primary beneficiaries, are referred to as
“derivative beneficiaries.” 54 Derivative beneficiaries are entitled to the
same place in the visa line as the primary beneficiary, without the need to
file a separate visa petition. 55
2. Moving Through the Visa Queue: A Step-by-Step Checklist
for the Family-Sponsored Immigrant
The family visa preference process takes place in three steps. First, the
immigrant enters the visa line after a petition is submitted on her behalf. If
the petition is approved, the next step in the process is to determine where
the immigrant may apply for the visa. Finally, the petitioner is issued a visa
and exits the line if she is admitted to the United States.
The first step commences when the petitioner, a U.S. citizen or LPR, files
a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with USCIS on behalf of the

48. See § 1153(a)(1)–(4). Grandparents, aunts, uncles, in-laws, and cousins cannot
sponsor relatives for immigration. Family-Based Immigrant Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1306.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012). There are further limits on which family members LPRs may
petition for—married sons and daughters, parents, and siblings are all excluded. See
§ 1153(a) (listing relationships recognized under the INA).
49. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 254.
50. Id.; § 1152(a)(2).
51. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 254.
52. See id.
53. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2011); see also
§ 1153(d). A person is considered to be “accompanying” if he or she immigrates within six
months of the primary beneficiary’s immigration; otherwise, the individual is considered
“following to join.” 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1) (2011). Immigration-related statutes are found at
8 U.S.C. Regulations administering the functions of USCIS are found at 8 C.F.R.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). There are no derivative beneficiaries for immediate relatives.
See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4) (2011).
55. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4). The total number of visas issued for that family count
against the annual quota. BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 129.
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beneficiary. 56 The petitioner submits proof of her immigration status and
requests that USCIS classify the beneficiary within one of the three
immigrant relative categories recognized under the INA. 57 Once the Form
I-130 petition is prepared, the papers are mailed to a USCIS service center
that has jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner.58 USCIS
then investigates the merits of the petition and determines the validity of the
alleged familial relationship. 59
If the petition is approved and the beneficiary is an immediate relative of
a U.S. citizen, she may move to the next step in the process and be granted
a visa. 60 Otherwise, if the I-130 petition establishes one of qualifying
preference relationships, the beneficiary is granted a spot in line in the
appropriate family-preference category. The beneficiary’s place in line is
determined by the “priority date,” which is the date the I-130 petition was
filed on her behalf. 61 Derivative beneficiaries are given the same priority
date as the primary beneficiary. 62
Because demand for family preference visas continuously surpasses the
statutory ceiling in all categories, there are approximately 4.6 million
pending visa applications.63 The rate at which the line moves for each
immigrant is contingent on numerous factors, including the visa category,
the beneficiary’s country of citizenship, and the number of immigrants with
earlier priority dates. 64 Beneficiaries may wait a number of years before
their priority dates become current and they may apply for visas.65 For
example, visas are currently available for Filipino F4 beneficiaries with
priority dates before October 8, 1988—in other words, Filipino brothers and
sisters of U.S. citizens who have been waiting for over twenty-three years.66

56. See I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Forms” hyperlink; then follow “Petition for
Alien Relative” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
57. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 316.3. The statute states that the petition is filed with the “Attorney
General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). However, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, § 451(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2196, transferred this authority to USCIS.
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b).
60. § 1204.
61. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (“The filing date of a petition shall be the date it is properly filed
under paragraph (d) of this section and shall constitute the priority date.”).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
63. See Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and
Employment-Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1,
2011, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS 2 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/WaitingListItem.pdf.
64. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Because You’re Mine, I Walk the Line: The Trials and
Tribulations of the Family Visa Program, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 158 (2010).
65. See Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F. Supp. 2d 864,
869–70 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[D]ue to oversubscriptions in that visa preference category, visa
numbers might not be immediately available for the alien relative . . . .”).
66. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS 2 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/
visabulletin_Jan2012.pdf.
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The State Department is responsible for administering the distribution of
visas under the preference quota system. 67 The State Department issues a
Visa Bulletin each month, which reports cut-off dates that are currently
being processed for each family preference category and country. 68 If there
is too much demand, the category or foreign country with excessive
demand is then designated “oversubscribed.” 69 The cut-off date for an
oversubscribed category is the priority date of the first qualified visa
applicant who fell outside of the numerical limits. 70 Only a beneficiary
with an approved visa petition with a priority date earlier than the cutoff
date for her particular category and country is eligible for a visa number. 71
Once the beneficiary’s priority date has become current, the next step is
to determine where she can apply for the visa. 72 In general, there are two
paths to LPR status depending on whether the applicant is living in the
United States or another country at the time of application.73 If the
beneficiary is in the United States and is eligible to adjust her status to that
of an LPR, she may apply by submitting a Form I-485. 74 At the time of this
filing, there must be a visa number “immediately available” to the
immigrant under the applicable quota availability and preference
category. 75 To qualify for adjustment of status, an applicant must have
entered the United States lawfully, maintained lawful non-immigrant status,
and refrained from engaging in unauthorized employment.76 Applicants for
adjustment of status become LPRs of the United States and receive green
cards when their applications are approved. 77 USCIS has sole discretion to
grant or deny an application for adjustment of status.78
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(g).
68. See, e.g., Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1. The left side of the
visa bulletin shows the preference category, and the top of the bulletin indicates the country
in which the prospective immigrant is from. Only four individual countries are listed: China
(mainland born), India, Mexico, and the Philippines. If the prospective immigrant is not
from one of those four categories, she falls under the first column, which includes
immigrants from “all chargeability areas except those listed.” This allocation of visas by
nationality is called “foreign state chargeability.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b); 22 C.F.R. § 42.12
(2011). As a general rule, the term “chargeability” refers to the country where the alien was
born, and not his current nationality. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 129.
69. Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1. In order to prevent an
oversubscribed country’s immigration quota from being satisfied by immigrants in one
preference category, the State Department divides that nation’s visa numbers by category so
that they are in line with worldwide levels of immigration in that particular category.
WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 43, at 151–52.
70. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1.
71. Id.
72. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, supra note 4.
73. Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F. Supp. 2d 864, 868–71
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii) (2011); id. § 245.1.
75. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2).
76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255; BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 126. For a detailed analysis of
adjustment of status, see generally Lauren E. Sasser, Note, Waiting in Immigration Limbo:
The Federal Court Split over Suits to Compel Action on Stalled Adjustment of Status
Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2008).
77. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
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A person who does not qualify for adjustment of status in the United
States must apply for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in her country
of origin, regardless of whether she resides in the United States. 79 Once she
is issued a visa, she may enter the United States and potentially become an
LPR if admitted at a port of entry. 80
Finally, the beneficiary must establish that she is not inadmissible in
order to receive a visa. 81 This applies to beneficiaries who seek adjustment
of status as well as those who are outside of the United States. 82 When an
application is complete, USCIS makes a decision whether to grant LPR
status, and applicants receive notifications of these decisions by mail. 83 A
successful immigrant visa applicant becomes an LPR of the United States.84
Immigration eligibility is determined on the date of admission to the
United States or the date of adjudication of an application to adjust status.85
A derivative beneficiary may lose her “following to join” status if the
required relationship with the primary beneficiary is not preserved. 86 Thus,
because the classification of the child of a primary beneficiary is dependent
on his or her legal status as a “child,” approval of the parent’s visa petition
does not guarantee that the derivative beneficiary will ultimately be
permitted to immigrate to the United States.
3. Now What? Petition Denial, BIA Review, and the Road
to Federal Court
If the initial I-130 petition is denied by USCIS, the petitioner may file an
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.87 The BIA is the highest

79. § 1201(a)(1); see also Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F.
Supp. 2d 864, 868–69 (N.D. Ill. 2007). This path is also known as consular processing. See
Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis (follow “Green Card” hyperlink; then follow “Consular Processing” hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
80. § 1255. After a visa is granted, a foreign national may travel to a port of entry and
request permission to enter the United States; however, a visa does not guarantee entry. See
Family-Based Immigrant Visas, supra note 48.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2). Admission is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Grounds for inadmissibility under § 1182 include immigration violations,
national security grounds, criminal grounds, public health-related grounds, and others. See
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 420.
82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
83. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(19) (2011).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
85. §§ 1182, 1255.
86. See 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.1 N7.1 (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86920.pdf. Examples of failures
to maintain this relationship include the death of a parent, the parent’s loss of status, or the
derivative beneficiary’s marrying or aging out. Id.; see also Ward v. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d
1198, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the loss of derivative eligibility following the
death of primary beneficiary parent); Khan, 14 I. & N. Dec. 122, 123–24 (B.I.A. 1972)
(denying eligibility for derivative beneficiary wife and child due to death of primary
beneficiary).
87. See Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 299 (B.I.A. 1985).
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administrative body for decisions on immigration law.88 The beneficiary or
derivative beneficiary cannot apply directly for review of his or her case.89
There is also no form of administrative appeal if USCIS denies an alien’s
Form I-485. 90 A beneficiary or derivative beneficiary who has filed to
adjust her status may only raise the issue before an immigration judge if
DHS initiates removal proceedings. 91 It is entirely within the discretion of
DHS to commence these proceedings. 92
The BIA hears appeals from immigration judges’ decisions in removal
proceedings as well as appeals from certain USCIS decisions.93 The Board
may then issue a final administrative decision that is binding on all
immigration judges, DHS officers, and DHS employees involved in that
particular case. 94 If the opinion is designated as precedential, it is binding
in similar cases as well. 95
There are two relevant avenues of review in the federal courts that
immigrants have used to contest the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang,
depending on whether the aged-out alien is inside or outside of the country.
First, aliens who are already present in the United States and who have been
ordered removed by the BIA have submitted petitions for judicial review of
the removal orders in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held.96
Second, parents who seek to be reunited with their aged-out children who
have been left behind in their home country have filed suit in federal district
court, alleging that the BIA has misinterpreted a provision of the Child
Status Protection Act. 97 These cases have then been appealed to the circuit
courts. 98
C. The Child Status Protection Act
The CSPA may be described as tolling a statute of limitations, as it
“freezes” a child’s age when a visa petition is filed so that he or she does

88. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). The U.S. Attorney General has delegated to the
BIA the power to exercise its “independent judgment and discretion in considering and
determining the cases coming before [it].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
89. See Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 299.
90. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D. Mass. 2007); 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii).
91. For an in-depth discussion of removal (previously known as deportation)
proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. § 240.
92. See, e.g., Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Attorney
General has discretion regarding when and whether to initiate deportation proceedings.”).
93. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 4.
94. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).
95. Id.
96. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2011). Section 242 of the INA
allows jurisdiction over these proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
97. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). The
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review Form I-130 petitions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
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not lose his or her immigration eligibility. 99 Those challenging the BIA’s
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) have argued that the statutory
provision not only freezes the ages of beneficiaries and derivative
beneficiaries within the F2A category, but should also be extended to F2B,
F3, and F4 petitions. In order to fully comprehend the interpretive question
confronted by the courts, it is essential to look at the statute’s enactment,
legislative history, and text.
1. Enactment of the CSPA
On August 6, 2002, Congress enacted the CSPA 100 in order to preserve
the immigration eligibility of children who have “aged out” of their
derivative status. 101 Subsection (h) 102 of the CSPA amended 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153 by permitting children with timely filed family-based, employmentbased, and diversity visas submitted before they turned twenty-one to

99. See Shane Dizon, The Child Status Protection Act: Does Immigration Math Solve
the Family Unity Equation?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 134 (2004).
100. Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002).
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 2–3 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 641–
642.
102. The specific language reads:
(h) Rules for determining whether certain aliens are children
(1) In general
For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, a determination
of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) of section 1101(b)(1) of this title shall be made using—
(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number
becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of subsection (d) of this
section, the date on which an immigrant visa number became available
for the alien’s parent), but only if the alien has sought to acquire the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one
year of such availability; reduced by
(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition
described in paragraph (2) was pending.
(2) Petitions described
The petition described in this paragraph is—
(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of
this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for
classification of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section;
or
(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary under
subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this
title for classification of the alien’s parent under subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section.
(3) Retention of priority date
If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age
or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the
alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category
and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the
original petition.
(4) Application to self-petitions
Paragraphs (1) through (3) shall apply to self-petitioners and derivatives of
self-petitioners.
8 U.S.C. § 1153(h).
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remain eligible for the original visa until it became available.103 In the
House Report accompanying the first version of the CSPA, the Committee
on the Judiciary stated that the bill’s purpose was to modify the INA “by
providing that the alien’s status as a child is determined as of the date on
which the petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative is filed.”104
The CSPA underwent subsequent changes as the bill was referred to the
Senate, incorporating retention of child status for children of permanent
residents, family and employer-sponsored immigrants, diversity lottery
winners, and refugees and asylees. 105
2. Legislative Intent: Administrative Delay, Visa Demand,
and Displacement
One undisputed reason why Congress enacted the CSPA was because it
recognized enormous backlogs in processing and adjudication of visa
petitions and applications. 106 These delays resulted in the aging out of
child beneficiaries of visa petitions, who would often turn twenty-one
before their applications were processed.107 Because these applicants had
aged out of visa eligibility, they were forced to shift into a lower preference
category and were placed at the bottom of the long visa waiting list. 108 The
legislative history emphasized these administrative delays. 109
Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate expressed
concern that administrative delay and the ensuing age-out problem were
separating families. 110 Senator Diane Feinstein, who introduced the bill in
103. See id.
104. H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 1–2.
105. See 147 CONG. REC. 9954 (2001).
106. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (noting that the INS
had faced a dramatic increase in the number of visa applications filed, and when combined
with slow service and filing systems, current waits for adjudications ranged from three to
five years).
107. See Bolvito v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] qualifying familial
relationship that is terminated due to . . . ‘aging out’ . . . no longer entitles the derivative
[beneficiary] to accompanying or following to join benefits.”) (quoting 3 CHARLES GORDON
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 37.05[2][a] (2004)).
108. See id. at 435–36; Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (prior to the
enactment of the CSPA, alien aged out of eligibility while application to adjust status was
pending adjudication). This also applied to derivative beneficiaries who married while their
visa petitions were pending. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 136. The aging-out problem is at
issue in the current litigation, however, and thus is the focus of this Note.
109. H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 1–2; 147 CONG. REC. 9955 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee) (“[S]ome sons and daughter of citizens . . . have to stay on a waiting list from 2
to 13 years entirely because the INS did not in a timely manner process the applications for
adjustment of status on their behalf.”); id. at 9954 (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner) (“If a
U.S. citizen parent petitions for a green card for a child before that child turns 21, but the
INS does not get around to processing the adjustment of status application until after the
child turns 21, the family is out of luck.”); id. at 9955 (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Children
of citizens are penalized because it takes the INS an unacceptable length of time—often
years—to process adjustment of status applications.”).
110. See 147 CONG. REC. 9955 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“We believe that this
will reunite families.”); 148 CONG. REC. 13,744 (2002) (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner)
(“[The CSPA] facilitates and hastens the reuniting of legal immigrants’ families.”).

2012]

“AGING OUT” OF IMMIGRATION

2213

the Senate, observed that emigrating parents whose children’s applications
had been pending for years had to decide whether to come to the United
States and leave a child behind, or “remain in their country of origin and
lose out on their American dream in the United States.” 111 She explained
that LPRs who already lived in the United States faced a similar separation
dilemma. They had to choose whether to send their child who had aged out
of visa eligibility back to his or her country of origin, or to have their child
remain in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws, and
therefore vulnerable to removal. 112 Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, the
Act’s co-sponsor, noted that the CSPA was intended to solve “the age out
problem without displacing others who have been waiting patiently in other
visa categories.” 113
Unlike the members of the House of Representatives, Senator Feinstein
did acknowledge delays caused by visa demand as well as agency
processing time. She observed that a child might be unable to immigrate
“either because the INS was unable to adjudicate the application before the
child’s 21st birthday, or because growing immigration backlogs in the
immigration visa category caused the visa to be unavailable before the child
reached his 21st birthday.” 114 Following the Senate amendment, there was
additional discussion in the House about USCIS processing delays before
the bill was passed. 115
3. The CSPA Formula in Practice
Under the CSPA, the calculation for determining the age of the child
beneficiary is done via a subtraction formula. The child’s age freezes as of
the date that the visa became available for the relevant petition, reduced by
the number of days that the petition was pending, but only if the child
applied for LPR status within one year of the date that the visa became
available.116 If the resulting number is less than twenty-one years, the
person may proceed as if he or she were still a “child” under the INA.117
111. 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 9955 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
114. Id. at 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
115. See 148 CONG. REC. 13,743 (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner) (“The Senate bill
addresses three other situations where alien children lose immigration benefits by ‘aging out’
as a result of INS processing delays.”); id. at 13,744 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“The
Senate expanded this bill to cover other situations where alien children lose immigration
benefits by aging out as a result of INS processing delays.”); id. at 13,745 (statement of Rep.
Gekas) (“The bill was modified in the Senate to provide relief to other children who lose out
when the INS takes too long to process their adjustment of status applications . . . .”).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)–(2) (2006). For example, suppose a U.S. citizen filed an
I-130 for an alien relative on November 1, 2003. USCIS approved this petition on
November 14, 2003, and a visa became available on November 14, 2011. The application
would be “pending” with the agency for 14 days. Thus, to determine whether the
beneficiary or derivative beneficiary was still a “child” by the terms of the CSPA would
require subtracting 14 days from his age on November 14, 2011.
117. See Howard W. Gordon & Tina R. Niedzwiecki, CSPA: Leaving No Child Behind?,
in 1 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 289, 291 (2003–2004 ed.). A
Department of State cable issued in 2003 includes a sample worksheet to calculate a child’s

2214

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

This formula differs from other sections of the CSPA, which freeze the age
of minors at the petition’s filing date.118
Subsection (h)(1) of the CSPA provides a formula for determining the
age of a family-preference petition’s beneficiary, referencing subsections
(a)(2)(A) and (d) of § 1153, both of which concern children. 119 This
formula reduces the beneficiary’s biological age by “the number of days in
the period during which the applicable petition” was pending120—that is,
the number of days between when the beneficiary filed the petition with
USCIS and when the agency approved it. In this way, subsection (h)(1)
“ensures that an alien does not lose ‘child’ status solely because of
administrative delays in the processing of an otherwise valid petition.” 121 It
does not address the more extensive delays that often occur between when a
petition is approved by USCIS and when a visa becomes available. 122
Subsection (h)(2), “Petitions described,” highlights two sets of visa
petitions to which subsection (h)(1)’s formula pertains. Subsection (2)(A)
refers to F2A petitions for children of LPRs,123 while subsection (2)(B)
refers to any family-based, employment-based, or diversity-based visa
petition for which a child is a derivative beneficiary. 124
Subsection (h)(3), “Retention of priority date,” refers to aliens who are
twenty-one or over even after subsection (h)(1)’s subtraction formula is
calculated. In this situation, “the alien’s petition shall automatically be
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 125 This is notably
distinct from the relief provided by subsection (h)(1), which permits an
aged-out alien to retain visa eligibility as a “child” using the original
petition filed on their behalf.126 In contrast, relief under paragraph (3)
allows the alien to move into a different visa category by automatically
converting her petition, even as an adult. 127 She is also entitled to priority
date retention for her original petition.128
In practice, the CSPA formula prevents a minor beneficiary from
winding up at the end of the extensive visa waiting list, even after she has
age under the CSPA. See Child Status Protection Act: ALDAC 2, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan.
17, 2003), http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_1369.html.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f) (freezing the age of a child of a U.S. citizen to the filing date of
the petition); § 1158(b)(3)(B) (preventing children listed on asylum petitions from aging out
of derivative status).
119. § 1153(h)(1). Subsection (a)(2)(A) makes visas available to “children of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” § 1152(a)(2)(A). Subsection (d) allows visas to
be issued to “child[ren] . . . if accompanying or following to join, the . . . parent.” § 1152(d).
120. § 1153(h)(1).
121. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011).
122. Id. In the example from note 116, supra, the beneficiary or derivative beneficiary’s
age would not be reduced to reflect the seven-year wait between November 15, 2003 and
November 15, 2011.
123. § 1153(h)(2)(A).
124. § 1153(h)(2)(B).
125. § 1153(h)(3).
126. § 1153(h)(1).
127. § 1153(h)(3).
128. See id.
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turned twenty-one. The beneficiary does not have to file a new petition, but
rather, may retain her original priority date while moving into the queue for
a lower preference category. The CSPA thus remedies “the often harsh and
arbitrary effects of the age-out provisions under the previously existing
statute.” 129
D. Judicial Review of Agency Action
The specific contention that the circuit courts have addressed is which
family-preference categories § 1153(h)(3)’s priority date retention provision
includes. The BIA, which administers the CSPA, has determined that this
provision provides age-out protection only to F2A petitions.130 If the
agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, then the petitioners in the
cases at issue would have no remedy in the courts. It is therefore
imperative to provide an overview of the legal theory underlying judicial
deference to agency action.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act 131 (APA) describes what procedures a
court must employ in its review of agency decisions. The court’s review
follows different procedures depending on whether the questions are ones
of law or fact. 132 In the relevant cases, the facts are not disputed by the
parties. Rather, the statutory issue the courts have confronted is purely a
question of law: the appropriate interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).
Under the APA, a final agency action can be set aside only if it is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 133 A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.” 134
2. Chevron Deference and Its Scope
The seminal case on the scope of judicial review of agency statutory
construction is the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 135 In Chevron, the Court
articulated two inquiries that a court should perform in evaluating an

129. Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004).
130. See infra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
131. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C) (describing questions of law); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)–
(F) (describing questions of fact).
133. § 706(2)(A).
134. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
135. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers. 136 First, the court
must ask whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue.” 137 If the statute addresses the issue and “the intent of
Congress is clear,” the court and the agency must give effect to that
legislative intent.138 But if Congress “has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue,” and consequently the statute is silent or ambiguous, then
the court must proceed to the second step of analysis. 139 At that point, the
court must give some deference to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute. 140 The critical inquiry then becomes whether “the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”141 If this construction
is a “reasonable policy choice for the agency to make,” then a court must
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. 142
Over the nearly two decades since the Chevron decision, judicial and
academic discourse has presented many views of how and when such
deference should apply. The broadest version, advocated by Justice
Antonin Scalia, requires Chevron deference to all agency decisions that are
“authoritative.” 143 Deference is then accorded to all determinations that the
agency makes, even those concerning the scope of its own “jurisdiction.” 144
Other understandings of Chevron may qualify this expansive view. 145 A
prior inquiry may take place before the Chevron framework is applied at all.
This stage, deemed “Chevron Step Zero,” 146 stipulates that the statute must
affirmatively delegate the agency rule making authority in each case. 147 In

136. Id. at 842.
137. Id. at 843.
138. Id. at 842–43.
139. Id. at 843.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 845. Step Two of Chevron analysis is generally concerned with the “arbitrary,
capricious and abuse of discretion” test of the APA and an examination of reasonableness.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611,
621 (2009) (“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the
‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in [APA] Section 706(2)(A)
supplies the metric for judicial oversight at Chevron’s second step.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (describing “permissible” as whether the
agency’s interpretation is “reasonable in light of the underlying law”).
143. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
343 (6th ed. 2006); United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
144. BREYER ET AL., supra note 143, at 343.
145. Id.
146. Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman introduced the term
“Chevron Step Zero” as the initial inquiry to determine whether Chevron applies. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001). For an in-depth examination of Chevron Step Zero analysis, see Sunstein, supra
note 142.
147. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that a tariff classification could
not receive Chevron deference because there was no indication that Congress intended such
a ruling to carry the force of law); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(holding that opinion letters and “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
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addition, courts may use canons of statutory construction at the expense of
true Chevron analysis. 148 While courts in this situation claim to be
adhering to the Chevron standard, sources such as legislative history, other
statutes, and policy considerations are at the heart of these opinions.149 The
use of these “traditional tools of statutory construction,” 150 remains a matter
of judicial debate. 151
In the context of immigration, the Supreme Court has specifically
recognized “that the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives
ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of case-bycase adjudication.’” 152 Each of the federal district courts and circuit courts
that have considered the statutory question that is the focus of this Note
have quickly concluded that Chevron applies, and proceeded to use its twoprong test. 153 At Chevron Step One, the circuits have first looked to
§ 1153’s plain language, but have also employed canons of statutory
interpretation including textual structure, other statutory provisions, and
legislative history to determine whether Congress’s intent was ambiguous
or clear. 154 It is at this point, however, that the circuit courts have parted
ways.

manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant
Chevron-style deference”).
148. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 143, at 343.
149. Id.; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004)
(“[Chevron] deference to [an agency’s] statutory interpretation is called for only when the
devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of
congressional intent.”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (discussing Chevron towards the conclusion of the opinion only to
suggest that the Court owes “some degree of deference” to the agency’s reasonable
interpretation).
150. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
151. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that if courts substitute their interpretation of a statute for an agency’s through the
use of interpretive canons, “this approach would make deference a doctrine of
desperation . . . . This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.”).
152. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting Cardozo-Fonesca, 480
U.S. at 448 (majority opinion)). The Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001), however, creates uncertainty about whether all interpretations adopted in
adjudication necessitate deference. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 146, at 842–43; see,
e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (holding that because the BIA did not exercise
its interpretative authority and fully consider a statutory question, Chevron deference was
unwarranted).
153. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2011) (“As to the BIA’s
interpretation of immigration statutes, we defer to the BIA to the extent prescribed by
Chevron’s two-step analysis.” (citing Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir.
2006))); Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The parties
dispute whether aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions are entitled to this
relief. To answer this question, we undertake our Chevron analysis.”); Li v. Renaud, 654
F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Pursuant to its delegated authority, the BIA interpreted the
INA in a formal adjudication. Therefore we evaluate the BIA’s interpretation according to
[Chevron].” (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25)).
154. See infra Part II.B.
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II. THE CURRENT CSPA CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part II details the BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3). In Matter of
Wang, the BIA narrowly interpreted § 1153(h)(3) by holding that its
priority date retention and automatic conversion provisions do not apply to
a derivative beneficiary of a fourth preference family-based visa petition.155
Subsequently, the Second, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits considered whether the
provision applies to F3 and F4 petitions, and therefore grants age-out
protection to derivative beneficiaries of these petitions. This part discusses
the BIA’s interpretation in Wang before addressing each circuit court’s
decision in turn.
A. The BIA’s Precedential Decision in Matter of Wang
On March 25, 2008, the director of USCIS’s California Service Center
approved a F2B visa petition filed by an LPR on behalf of his unmarried
daughter. 156 The director denied the petitioner’s request, however, to
assign an earlier priority date to this petition.157 That earlier priority date
came from a previous F4 petition of which his daughter was a derivative
beneficiary. 158 By the time the petitioner was admitted to the United States
using the F4 petition’s priority date, his daughter had aged out of child
status. 159 Although the director refused to approve the earlier priority date,
because she was uncertain about the scope of age-out protection under the
CSPA, she certified her decision to the BIA for review. 160
In Wang, the BIA considered whether an aged-out derivative beneficiary
of an F4 visa petition may automatically convert her status to the F2B
category pursuant to CSPA section 203(h), while retaining the original
petition’s priority date. 161 While the BIA had previously evaluated this
issue in a non-precedential opinion, Garcia, 162 here it examined the
statute’s language, regulatory framework, and legislative history. 163 The
three-member panel ultimately concluded that the Act did not provide relief
to Wang’s daughter because she had been a derivative beneficiary of an F4
family-based visa petition. 164
As a preliminary matter, the Board examined the structure of
§ 1153(h)(1) to (3). It determined that paragraphs (1) and (2) “when read in
tandem clearly define the universe of petitions that qualify for the [CSPA
formula],” in contrast to the text of paragraph (3), which “does not
expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and
155. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 39 (B.I.A. 2009).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 28–29.
159. Id. at 29.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id.
162. A79 001 587, 2006 WL 2183654 (B.I.A. June 16, 2009).
163. See Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33 n.7.
164. Id. at 38–39. The BIA later denied a motion to reconsider its decision. See Wang,
A088 484 947 (B.I.A. May 21, 2010).
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retention of priority dates.” 165 After finding that the language of the
provision was ambiguous, the BIA considered the usage of “conversion”
and “retention” in other regulations. 166 The Board observed that in
immigration regulations the term “conversion” consistently refers to a visa
petition that moves from one category to another.167 As a result, the
beneficiary of that petition transfers her classification but does not need to
file a new visa petition.168 Similarly, the Board noted that the concept of
“retention” of priority dates has always been limited to visa petitions filed
by the same family member, whereas petitions filed by relatives receive
their own priority dates. 169 The BIA assumed that when Congress enacted
the CSPA, it was aware of how these regulatory terms were commonly
used. 170
The BIA then applied these concepts to the case at hand. The Board
determined that when Wang’s daughter aged out from her status as a
derivative beneficiary on the F4 petition, there was no family preference
category that her visa could be converted to because there is no category
that applies to the niece of a U.S. citizen.171 In addition, the new F2B
petition was filed on the beneficiary’s behalf by a different petitioner—her
father rather than her aunt.172 The BIA determined that this could not be
reconciled with the historical usage of the term “retention.”173 The Board
found that the statutory text did not plainly indicate that as long as a parent
became an LPR through any visa preference category, all children listed as
derivative beneficiaries would receive superior priority date status, even for
new visa petitions that might be filed at any future date.174 Accordingly,
the BIA examined the statute’s legislative history for clear evidence of
congressional intent to expand historical use of the terms “automatic
conversion” and “priority date retention.”175
The Board observed that the CSPA was principally enacted due to
concern about extensive administrative delays in the processing of visa
petitions and applications, which resulted in the aging out of beneficiaries
of petitions filed by U.S. citizens. 176 The BIA noted that the Act’s
legislative history refers generally to the Senate amendment that added
children of family and employment-based visas and diversity visas, but
does not illuminate an intention behind these additions.177 The BIA
emphasized that the historical record of the CSPA does not provide clear
165. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33.
166. Id. at 33–34.
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (B.I.A. 2001); Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec.
1362, 1369 (B.I.A. 2001).
171. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 35–36.
172. Id. at 36.
173. Id. at 38.
174. Id. at 36.
175. Id. at 36–38.
176. Id. at 36–37.
177. Id. at 37.
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evidence that it aimed to address waits due to visa allocation issues, for
example, the delay connected to priority dates. 178 The Board found that if
automatic conversion and priority date retention for F4 visas were allowed,
the beneficiary would “jump” to the front of the F2B visa category line,
thus causing aliens who had been waiting for years to spend even more time
on line. 179 The BIA thus declined to expand automatic conversion and
priority date retention provisions. It found that the CSPA does not
demonstrate “legislative intent to create an open-ended grandfathering of
priority dates that allow[s] derivative beneficiaries to retain an earlier
priority date set in the context of a different relationship, to be used at any
time.” 180
The BIA’s decision in Wang, while focused on F4 petitions, effectively
limits the scope of § 1153(h)(3) to petitions in which the primary or
derivative beneficiary is the son or daughter of an LPR: from F2A to F2B
conversions. 181 This is the only type of petition that allows an aged-out
beneficiary’s petition to “automatically be converted” to an “appropriate
category” without requiring a different petitioner.182 In this situation, an
aged-out primary beneficiary of an F2A petition filed by her LPR parent
can become the beneficiary of a subsequent F2B petition filed by the same
parent. 183 This is also possible for an aged-out derivative beneficiary of an
F2A petition filed by an LPR parent on behalf of a spouse. 184 Aged-out
derivative beneficiaries of F2B, F3, and F4 petitions, however, are not
eligible to convert these petitions to a different category without obtaining a
new petitioner. 185
B. The Circuits Speak
Following the BIA’s decision in Wang, three appellate courts have
construed the scope of section 1153(h)(3) using the standard of
administrative deference articulated in Chevron.186 At Chevron Step One,
178. Id. at 38.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at 964 (quoting Wang, 25 I. & N. at 33).
183. Id.
184. Id. F2A petitions may list children as primary or derivative beneficiaries. Id. at 964
n.6. In order to reduce visa filing expenses, an LPR may opt to include a child as a
derivative beneficiary on an F2A petition for a spouse rather than as a primary beneficiary
on an additional F2A petition. Id.
185. Id.
186. These cases involved aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 visa petitions,
with essentially similar facts to Wang. Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 365–66 (5th Cir.
2011), concerned an aged-out derivative beneficiary who had entered the U.S. on a visitor’s
visa as a young child. His application for adjustment of status was denied by USCIS, who
subsequently initiated removal proceedings. Id. at 366. In contrast, the plaintiffs in Cuellar
de Osorio and Li v. Renaud were parents whose children aged out of derivative status due to
lengthy visa wait times and were no longer eligible to immigrate to the United States. See
Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 957–59; Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 2011). The
minor factual distinctions between these cases, however, have no impact on the interpretive
question faced by the courts.
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the courts have relied on tools of statutory interpretation after their
examination of the plain text.187 The Second and Fifth Circuits concluded
that congressional intent is clear and thus no deference to the BIA is
warranted. While the Second Circuit found that there was not an
appropriate category for petitions to convert to other than those in the F2A
category, the Fifth Circuit held that all derivative beneficiaries of familybased petitions are entitled to relief under § 1153(h)(3). In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit determined that § 1153(h)(3) was ambiguous, and proceeded
to Chevron Step Two, where it found that the BIA’s interpretation of the
statute was permissible.
1. The Second Circuit
In Li v. Renaud, 188 the Second Circuit became the first appellate court to
consider the reach of § 1153(h)(3) of the CSPA. The district court had
found that § 1153(h)(3) was ambiguous because it did not explicitly define
which petitions were eligible for automatic conversion and priority date
retention. 189 The Second Circuit contended that for Chevron purposes,
however, “an alleged ambiguity in some part of the statutory provision at
issue does not end the inquiry.” 190 Rather, at Chevron Step One, a
reviewing court must ask whether Congress has addressed the “precise
question at issue” in enacting the provision.191 The court found that
Congress’s intent clearly prohibits a derivative beneficiary who ages out of
a family preference petition from retaining the priority date of that petition
if it cannot be converted to an “appropriate category.” 192 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit concluded that deference to the BIA’s interpretation of
§ 1153(h)(3) was not warranted. 193
In evaluating whether the derivative beneficiary was entitled to age-out
protection under the CSPA, the court first examined the provision’s textual
structure. 194 The court construed § 1153(h)(3) as a straightforward
sentence construction—“if X, [then] A and B.” 195 If the alien’s age is
calculated as twenty-one years or above without the USCIS processing
delay, then “[A] the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the
appropriate category and [B] the alien shall retain the original priority date

187. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 961 (“Our first charge under Chevron is to
ascertain, by ‘employing traditional tools of statutory construction,’ whether ‘Congress had
intention on the precise question at issue.” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))); see also Khalid, 655 F.3d at 366 (“To
determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we employ the ‘traditional tools of statutory
construction.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)); Li, 654 F.3d at 382–83 (also using
“the traditional tools of statutory construction”).
188. Li, 654 F.3d 376.
189. Li v. Renaud, 709 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 376.
190. Li, 654 F.3d at 382.
191. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
192. Id. at 383.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
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issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 196 The Second Circuit
explained that while in some circumstances it is possible that the word
“and” means “or” in a statute, Congress deliberately constructed the
provision at issue in order to prevent that outcome. 197 Congress could have
allowed beneficiaries to seek (1) conversion, (2) retention, or (3) both
conversion and retention, but had in fact specified automatic conversion to
an appropriate category and retention of the initial priority date. 198
The court pointed to section 6 of the CSPA, codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(k), which separates conversion and retention benefits so that a
beneficiary may choose whether or not to convert the petition.199 The court
noted that this provision allows a beneficiary to avoid a conversion that
would place them in a longer queue in another preference category.200
Prior to the enactment of the CSPA, when a sponsoring parent of an adult
son or daughter naturalized and became a U.S. citizen, the petition was
converted from the F2B to the F1 category. 201 This conversion forced sons
and daughters of Filipino immigrants to wait in a longer visa waiting
line. 202 Under current law, if an LPR files a F2B visa, and the LPR then
naturalizes before his or her unmarried son or daughter receives a visa, then
the petition “shall be converted” to an F1 petition. 203 The following
paragraph, however, plainly states that the beneficiary may “elect[] not to
have such conversion occur (or if it has occurred, to have such conversion
revoked).” 204 Finally, § 1155(k)(3) provides that “[r]egardless of whether a
petition is converted under this subsection or not,” the beneficiary can retain
the original petition’s priority date.205
The Second Circuit noted that these statutory provisions specify that
conversion is elective, and that a beneficiary is entitled to maintain the
priority date of the initial petition whether or not conversion occurs.206
Conversion and retention thus represent “distinct and independent” benefits
in § 1154(k)(3), but comprise joint benefits in § 1153(h)(3).207 The court
contended that because the two provisions were within the same statute,
“Congress was aware of the possibility of making the benefits [in
§ 1153(h)(3)] ‘distinct and independent’ and we cannot assume that
Congress unintentionally failed to do so.” 208
Because the Second Circuit concluded that congressional intent required
automatic conversion and original priority date retention in § 1153(h)(3), it
next considered whether automatic conversion was possible for a derivative
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 55–56 (2003)).
Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(1) (2006).
§ 1154(k)(2).
Li, 654 F.3d at 383 (quoting § 1154(k)(3)).
See id. at 383–84.
See id. at 384.
Id.
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beneficiary of an F3 petition. 209 Here, the court followed the lead of the
BIA and looked to the historical usage of these terms. The court noted that
in other immigration regulations, the phrase “automatically be ‘converted to
the appropriate category’” must refer to when the category of the petition is
altered but where the identity of the petitioner is not.210 For example,
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i) specifies three examples where a petition converts from
one category to another: the beneficiary’s change in marital status, the
beneficiary’s attainment of age twenty-one, and the petitioner’s
naturalization.211 In each of these situations, the petitioner is unchanged.212
The Second Circuit concluded that this is also seen in various provisions in
the CSPA; in every occurrence where the word “conversion” is used, it
describes a change from one category to another, but this change does not
include a new petition. 213 The court noted that § 1153(h)(3) in particular
precisely states that conversion is “to the appropriate category” but not to an
additional petition filed by a new relative. 214 Although the Second Circuit
did not apply Chevron deference, 215 it agreed in effect with the BIA that
there was no “appropriate category” to which to convert a derivative
beneficiary’s visa petition, and that therefore the CSPA does not extend to
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of petitions not in the F2A category. 216
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit considered the applicability of § 1153(h)(3) to
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions in Cuellar de
Osorio v. Mayorkas. 217 In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
found that congressional intent was unclear at Chevron Step One. 218 At
Chevron Step Two, because the Ninth Circuit determined that the BIA’s
interpretation was reasonable, the court afforded deference to the BIA. 219
At Chevron Step One, the court first addressed the statute’s plain
language. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that the
word “petition” in paragraph (3) was ambiguous because it did not specify
exactly which petitions it encompassed.220 The court explained that this
was not required because paragraph (3)’s initial clause is subject to the
209. See id.
210. See id. (quoting § 1153(h)(3)).
211. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i)(1)–(3) (2011).
212. Li, 654 F.3d at 384.
213. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) as providing “conversion from F2A to
immediate relative petition,” § 1151(f)(3) as providing “conversion from F3 to F1 or from
F3 to immediate relative petition,” and § 1154(k)(1) as providing “conversion from F2B to
F1”).
214. Id.
215. See id. at 383.
216. See id. at 385.
217. 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011). This case consolidated two appeals from the Central
District of California: Cuellar de Osorio’s case and Costelo v. Chertoff, 258 F.R.D. 600
(C.D. Cal. 2009), a separate class action lawsuit. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958–59.
218. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 963.
219. Id. at 965.
220. See id. at 961.
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activation of paragraph (1)’s subtraction formula.221 In other words, only if
the age-reduction calculation in paragraph (1) determines that an alien is
twenty-one or above will paragraph (3) then be activated.222 According to
the court, “the alien” referenced in paragraph (3) must be the one described
in paragraph (1). 223 Therefore, “the alien’s petition” must relate to the
“applicable petition” described in paragraph (1)(B).224 The court reasoned
that if the alien had a petition that was not an “applicable petition” as
defined in paragraph (1), there would be no purpose in performing the
paragraph (1) calculation. 225
The court also observed that the “applicable petition” discussed in
paragraph (1) is defined by referring to the following paragraph.226
Paragraph (2) describes F2A petitions for a child as well as all family
preference petitions that list a child as a derivative beneficiary. 227 Thus,
paragraph (3) allows all of these petitions automatic conversions to the
appropriate preference category and retention of the original priority
date. 228
Although the Ninth Circuit found that § 1153(h)’s language was clear, it
still determined that paragraph (3)’s meaning was ambiguous because its
plain language would lead to “unreasonable or impracticable results” if
applied to some of the petitions included in paragraph (2).229 First, the
court observed that the phrase “the alien’s petition shall automatically be
converted to the appropriate category” implies that there is only one petition
filed by one petitioner on behalf of one beneficiary, which then moves into
a different category. 230 This reading not only corresponds with the ordinary
meaning of the word “automatic,” but also reflects existing regulatory
procedure. 231 Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit cited to 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(i), contending that “automatic” reclassification occurs in these
contexts with a change in definition of the parties relationship, but not with
a change in their identities.232
221. See id.
222. See id. The court used the example of Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio’s case to illustrate
its view of how paragraphs (1) and (3) relate to each other. See supra notes 1–10 and
accompanying text. The F3 petition of which Cuellar de Osorio was a direct beneficiary was
filed on May 5, 1998 and approved by USCIS on June 30, 1998. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d
at 961 n.4. Therefore, it was pending adjudication by the agency for 56 days. Id. Cuellar de
Osorio’s son, who was listed as a derivative beneficiary on this petition, was born on July
18, 1984. Id. When Cuellar de Osorio’s priority date became current on November 1, 2005,
and a visa became available to her, her son was 26 years and 106 days old. Id. After
subtracting the 56 days when his petition was “pending,” his age was 21 years and 50 days.
Id. Because he was above the age of 21, this triggered the paragraph (3) calculation. Id.
223. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 961 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)(B) (2006)).
224. Id. (citing § 1153(h)(1)(B)).
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 961–62 (citing Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126,
1133 (9th Cir. 2010); Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004)).
230. Id. at 962 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006)).
231. Id.
232. See id.
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The court noted that in the context of F3 and F4 petitions, however,
where a derivative beneficiary ages out, there is no “appropriate category”
to which the petition may “automatically be converted” with the same
petitioner.233 For example, where a child is a derivative beneficiary of an
F3 petition, the petitioner is his or her U.S. citizen grandparent. 234 When
the derivative beneficiary turns twenty-one, he or she is no longer able to
immigrate based on the grandparent’s petition, because such a relationship
is not recognized under U.S. immigration law. 235 Similarly, in the case of
an F4 petition, the petitioner is the derivative beneficiary’s U.S. citizen aunt
or uncle. 236 After the derivative turns twenty-one, he or she is also
ineligible to immigrate, because citizen aunts and uncles cannot file
petitions on behalf of their nieces and nephews.237 At the moment
paragraph (3) is triggered, automatic conversion into an “appropriate
category” may be possible for an aged-out F3 or F4 derivative beneficiary
based on the derivative’s relationship to the primary beneficiary. 238 “At
that point, the derivative’s parent may have obtained LPR status under the
original . . . petition,” and the aged-out derivative may qualify for the F2B
category. 239 But while this is an accepted relationship, this conversion
cannot automatically take place, because the LPR parent constitutes a new
petitioner. 240 The court refused to allow aged-out F3 and F4 derivatives to
convert their petitions to the F2B category, observing that this in effect
would be to disregard the word “automatically.” 241 Because the Ninth
Circuit found that automatic conversion could not feasibly apply to F3 and
F4 petitions, the court found that paragraph (3)’s meaning was
ambiguous. 242
Finally, regarding priority date retention, the Ninth Circuit determined
that congressional intent was unclear on whether priority date retention and
automatic conversion represented independent benefits.243 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that the text of paragraph (3), which
contains two grammatically independent clauses, may grant automatic
conversion and priority date retention as independent benefits.244 Yet the
court contended that this clause could also grant these two benefits jointly,
as both terms often, although not always, are used in conjunction with one

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing § 1153(a)).
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing § 1153(a)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 962–63 (citing Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004), for
the proposition that “[c]ourts must aspire to give meaning to every word of a legislative
enactment.”).
242. Id. at 963.
243. Id.
244. See id.
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another in family-sponsored immigration regulations. 245 Moreover, in
section 6 of the CSPA, Congress specified that these terms should function
independently. 246
The Ninth Circuit observed that because paragraph (2) may be
understood as conferring retention and conversion as independent or joint
benefits, the provision is ambiguous. 247 Therefore, the court consulted the
statute’s legislative history for clear evidence of congressional intent.248
Because the court determined that there was no record of which derivative
beneficiaries of family preference petitions qualified for age-out protection
under the CSPA, it proceeded to Chevron Step Two. 249
At Chevron Step Two, the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of
paragraph (3), which restricted the statute’s applicability to F2A petitions,
was “permissible.” 250 First, the court explained that the Board’s reasoning
is a plausible construction because it reflects how the word “automatic” is
normally used, “to describe something that occurs without requiring
additional input, such as a different petitioner.”251 In addition, the court
observed that under the BIA’s interpretation, § 1153(h)(3)’s citation to §
1153(d) does have a demonstrated effect. 252 Section 1153(d) entitles a
beneficiary’s child the same status as his or her parent. 253 According to the
BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3), derivative beneficiaries of F2A
petitions are entitled to age-out protection. 254 The court noted that without
this citation to subsection (d), § 1153(h)(3) would only cover primary
beneficiaries of F2A petitions, because subsection (a)(2)(A) references only
the spouses or children of LPRs. 255 Prior to the enactment of the CSPA, an
aged-out derivative beneficiary of an F2A petition received priority date
retention when an F2B petition was filed on his or her behalf.256 The court
noted, however, that this regulation does not confer automatic conversion or
refer to primary beneficiaries of F2A petitions who have aged out. 257
In addition, the court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that the
BIA’s interpretation in Wang conflicted with Congress’s expressed intent,
245. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i) (2011) as “providing priority date retention with
automatic conversion” but distinguishing § 204.2(a)(4) as “granting priority date retention
without automatic conversion”).
246. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(3) (2006).
247. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 963.
248. Id. (citing United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999)).
249. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 49–50 (2003)).
250. See id. at 964 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 964–65; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006) (referring to “subsections
(a)(2)(A) and (d)”).
253. § 1153(d).
254. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 964.
255. Id.
256. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4) (2011) (“[I]f the [derivative beneficiary of an F2A
petition] reaches the age of twenty-one prior to the issuance of a visa to the principal alien
parent, a separate petition will be required. In such a case, the original priority date will be
retained if the subsequent petition is filed by the same petitioner.”).
257. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 965.
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noting that the Act’s House sponsors only addressed age-out protection for
derivative beneficiaries resulting from processing delays. 258 While Senator
Feinstein had addressed oversubscription problems, she specifically
referred to children of LPRs, who could be beneficiaries or derivative
beneficiaries of F2A petitions. 259
The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected petitioners’ arguments that the BIA’s
interpretation was unreasonable because it did not create large scale change
within the family preference system and went against congressional intent.
The court advanced a theory of its own, that policy concerns supported the
BIA’s decision to limit those petitions to which § 1153(h)(3) should
The Ninth Circuit contended that limiting the statute’s
apply. 260
applicability to F2A petitions is a reasonable policy choice for the BIA to
make. 261 The court explained that if the statute was applied to all derivative
beneficiaries of family preference petitions, this “would result in a
fundamental change to the family preference scheme,” because any
derivative beneficiary of an F3 or F4 petition would be eligible for his or
her own priority date as the grandchild, niece, or nephew of a U.S.
citizen. 262 American immigration law, however, has never accepted these
relationships as qualifying under the statutory scheme. 263 In contrast,
derivatives of F2A petitions could also be primary beneficiaries of those
petitions and therefore receive individual priority dates. 264 The Ninth
Circuit ultimately exercised Chevron deference because the court found that
it is “not arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable for the BIA’s
interpretation . . . to draw the line where it does.” 265
3. The Fifth Circuit
Less than a week after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Cuellar de
Osorio, the Fifth Circuit became the third appellate court to analyze the
scope of § 1153(h)(3), in Khalid v. Holder. 266 The court held that this
provision of the CSPA was unambiguous and that an aged-out derivative
beneficiary of an F4 visa petition was entitled to relief.267 Although the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the BIA that the statute did not expressly define
which petitions qualified for age-out protection, 268 the court determined
that congressional intent clearly extended the benefits of § 1153(h)(3) to all
petitions included in § 1153(h)(2). 269 The Fifth Circuit thus refused to
defer to the BIA at Chevron Step One, holding that conversion was possible
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See 147 CONG. REC. 9954–55 (2001).
Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 965; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 964–65.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
655 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 375.
Id. at 370.
See id. at 373.
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even with a change in petitioner for derivative beneficiaries of all familybased petitions. 270
The court first considered whether the statute was ambiguous by
examining the plain language of § 1153(h)(1) through (h)(3). 271 The Fifth
Circuit contended that although paragraph (3) does not expressly define
which petitions qualify for age-out protection, the statutory provisions,
when taken together, clearly identify which petitions are included within
§ 1153(h)(3). 272 The BIA had discredited paragraph (2), the court found,
because unlike paragraph (1), paragraph (3) does not directly cite paragraph
(2). 273 However, the court noted that paragraph (3) explicitly refers to
paragraph (1), and that paragraph (1) then directly cites paragraph (2).274
The court observed that automatic conversion and priority date retention
depend on the outcome from the paragraph (1) calculation, which utilizes
the petitions included in paragraph (2).275 Thus, paragraph (3) necessarily
depends on the petitions included in paragraph (2), because paragraph (3)
can only be activated by the operation of paragraph (1).276 Because the
three subsections are interdependent, they collectively confirm that
Congress intended paragraph (3) to apply to any alien who “aged out”
under the paragraph (1) formula and was the beneficiary or derivative
beneficiary of a petition classified under paragraph (2).277
In addition to § 1153(h)’s overall structure, the Fifth Circuit also
examined the textual parallels between its subsections. Paragraphs (1) and
(3) both use the phrase “[f]or purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d).”278
While the BIA had applied paragraph (1)’s formula to derivative
beneficiaries of F4 petitions under § 1153(d), the court noted that the
agency had refused to do the same for paragraph (3) even though that
section had identical wording. 279 The Fifth Circuit contended that this
interpretation conflicts with the canon of construction that “‘identical words
and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same
meaning.’” 280 The court therefore found that “[t]he traditional canons of
statutory construction, and the interdependency between subsections (h)(1),
(h)(2), and (h)(3) compel the conclusion that the ‘[p]etitions described’ in
h(2) apply with equal force to (h)(1) and (h)(3).” 281 As a result, the court
disagreed with the BIA and determined that the statute, taken as a whole,
directly answered the question at issue. 282
270. Id. at 374–75.
271. Id. at 370.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 370–71.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 371.
277. Id.
278. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), (3) (2006).
279. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 371.
280. Id. (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232
(2007)).
281. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting § 1153(h)(2)).
282. Id.

2012]

“AGING OUT” OF IMMIGRATION

2229

The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA had ignored Congress’s direct intent
by reviewing the CSPA’s legislative history and regulatory practice
concerning conversion and priority date retention, but the court refuted
responses to each of the BIA’s arguments. 283 First, the Fifth Circuit
observed that the legislative history was inconclusive to support the BIA’s
position because “as is often the case with legislative history, statements
can be pulled from the record to support the contrary proposition as
well.” 284 The court noted that at least one member of Congress had
referred to the age-out problem in terms of agency delay as well as visa
demand. 285
Second, although the court accorded greater weight to the BIA’s
arguments concerning the customary usage of conversion and retention in
immigration regulations, it still found them unconvincing. 286 The court
noted that the plain language of paragraph (3) provides that conversion
occurs only after the age-reducing calculation is performed under the
paragraph (1) formula. 287 This cannot be made precisely when the child
ages out, because the paragraph (1) formula requires the age at which a visa
becomes available to the alien. 288 Only at this point does paragraph (1)’s
formula become calculable, thereby triggering paragraph (3)’s automatic
conversion. 289 When the derivative beneficiary’s priority date becomes
current, there is another category available to which to convert the petition
on the basis of the derivative’s relationship to the primary beneficiary. 290
Regarding priority date retention, the Fifth Circuit observed that while in
the past this practice had required the same petitioner on both the original
and new petitions, this practice is of “no impediment to Congress enacting a
law which provides retention of priority dates even where the petitioner is
different, as it appears to have done here.” 291 The court also noted that
priority date retention is permitted in other immigration contexts that
involve a change of petitioner, such as for beneficiaries of employmentbased visa petitions, who may retain the original priority date for “‘any
subsequently filed petition for any classification’ of a new job within three
major employment categories, regardless of a change in the employer who
files the petition.” 292

283. See id. at 371–73.
284. Id. at 371.
285. Id. at 371–72; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
286. See Khalid, 655 F.3d at 372–73.
287. Id. at 372.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that the BIA itself had suggested this in Garcia, an
earlier non-precedential case on the same issue. See A79 001 587, 2006 WL 2183654, at *4
(B.I.A. June 16, 2006) (“We agree with the respondent that where an [alien] was classified
as a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the ‘appropriate category’ for purposes of
section [1153(h)(3)] is that which applies to the ‘aged-out’ derivative vis-a-vis the principal
beneficiary of the original petition.”).
291. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 372.
292. Id. at 372–73; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(e) (2011).
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit observed that using the BIA’s reasoning, the
retention benefit would only apply to converted petitions.293 The court
noted, however, that if retention was permitted only for petitions that
“‘automatically . . . converted to the appropriate category,’” paragraph (3)
would be devoid of meaning. 294 This is because there would always be a
single petition, with the same priority date, and therefore no purpose for a
clause entitling the alien to “‘retain the date of the original priority date
issued upon the receipt of the original petition.’” 295 Moreover, the court
found that this language allows for the possibility of two separate petitions
because it may imply that there is another petition involved that is not the
original one. 296
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its reading of § 1153(h)(3) could
create “procedural difficulties” for USCIS, but it determined that this
potential problem was not the judiciary’s responsibility to resolve.297
Because the court found that Congress had spoken directly to the
interpretive problem at issue, it refused to defer to the BIA’s decision in
Wang. 298 The Fifth Circuit held that all derivative beneficiaries may
convert their family-based visa petitions to an appropriate category, and
consequently, they are entitled to age-out protection under the CSPA. 299
III. IN DEFENSE OF DEFERENCE:
ADOPTING THE CUELLAR DE OSORIO INTERPRETATION
Courts should defer to the BIA as the Ninth Circuit did in Cuellar de
Osorio, and reject both the Second Circuit’s holding in Li and the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Khalid. As an initial matter, this Note agrees with each
of the circuit courts that Chevron is the appropriate test for this issue of
statutory interpretation. It is well settled that BIA decisions are formal
adjudications that warrant Chevron deference.300 This Note’s analysis
therefore begins at Chevron Step One, examining the plain language of
§ 1153(h)(3) and employing the traditional tools of statutory construction in
order to ascertain congressional intent.301 Part III first contends at Chevron
Step One that the text of § 1153(h)(3) is unambiguous. It concludes,
however, that the statute itself is ambiguous for three principal reasons: (1)
automatic conversion is impracticable for certain petitions; (2) conversion
and priority date retention may be construed as either joint or independent
benefits; and (3) the legislative record of the CSPA is not instructive on
congressional intent. This part then contends at Chevron Step Two that the
293. See Khalid, 655 F.3d at 373 (citing In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.11 (5th Cir.
1980) (stating that courts should give effect, whenever possible, “to all parts of a statute and
avoid an interpretation which makes a part redundant or superfluous”)).
294. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3)(2006)).
295. See id. (quoting § 1153(h)(3)).
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 373–74.
300. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
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BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) is permissible and that, consequently,
courts should defer to the agency’s decision.
A. Chevron Step One: The Statute Is Ambiguous
While the text of § 1153(h)(3) when considered in isolation is clear, the
statutory provision is ambiguous in practice. First, it does not provide
conversion automatically for all petitions. In addition, in spite of whether
automatic conversion is possible, § 1153(h)(3) is also unclear on whether
automatic conversion and priority date retention must be applied jointly or
independently. Finally, the legislative history of § 1153(h)(3) does not
demonstrate Congress’s explicit intent to provide age-out protection to
derivative beneficiaries of family preference petitions.
1. The Plain “Language” of § 1153(h)(3) Clearly Allows Conversion
for All Petitions
While 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) does not specify which petitions it applies
to, the statute’s text is straightforward. 302 The calculation in paragraph (1)
prompts the operation of paragraph (3).303 Paragraph (3) cannot function
independently at the moment the derivative beneficiary turns twenty-one. 304
This is because it is not triggered until paragraph (1)’s subtraction formula
determines that he or she is over the age of twenty-one even after
subtracting the pending time of the petition.305 Following this calculation,
paragraph (3) dictates that “the alien’s petition shall automatically be
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 306
The “alien” described in paragraph (3) must be one within the scope of
paragraph (1). 307 Therefore, “the alien’s petition” must indicate the
“applicable petition” referenced in paragraph (1)(B).308 If this language
referred to a different petition, then the paragraph (1) calculation would
never have been performed, and paragraph (3) would be meaningless.309
In defining the scope of its application, paragraph (1) refers explicitly to
“the applicable petition described in paragraph (2).” 310 Paragraph (2)(A)
describes F2A petitions for children of LPRs, while paragraph (2)(B) refers
to family preference petitions for which a child is a derivative
beneficiary. 311 Thus, the statutory construction of § 1153(h)(1)–(3) can be

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), (3) (2006).
See id.
See id.
§ 1153(h)(3).
See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
See § 1153(h)(1)(B), (3).
See id.
§ 1153(h)(1)(B).
§ 1153(h)(2).
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read to encompass all petitions in paragraph (2) and to permit automatic
conversion and priority date retention for all of these petitions.312
2. The Statute Does Not Permit Automatic Conversion
for Petitions Other than F2A Petitions
Although § 1153’s language is clear, the provision in practice is
ambiguous because paragraph (3) does not make sense when read in
context. It does not permit automatic conversion for all family-based visa
petitions. The clause “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted
to the appropriate category” is consistent with both the common
understanding of the word “automatic” and with current immigration
regulatory practice. 313 First, the term “automatic” suggests an involuntary,
mechanized process, and not one that involves an entirely different
document as well as a different petitioner and different beneficiary. 314 In
similar family-preference situations, only the relationship between the
parties change, not their identities, so the petition is merely reclassified into
another category. 315 For F2B, F3, and F4 petitions, however, when a
derivative beneficiary ages out, there is no “appropriate category” for the
original petition to automatically convert to with the same petitioner.316
Because automatic conversion is not feasible for these types of petitions,
§ 1153(h)(3)’s actual meaning must be ambiguous, although its
“language”—when considering the structural construction only and not the
lexical context—appears unambiguous. In short, a structural analysis of the
statutory language points in one direction, while a contextual analysis of the
same language points in the opposite direction, resulting in unavoidable
ambiguity.
3. It Is Unclear Whether Automatic Conversion
and Priority Date Retention Are Joint or Independent Benefits
Regardless of whether automatic conversion is permissible, the text of
§ 1153(h)(3) is also vague with respect to whether priority date retention
can be applied independently. The Second Circuit erred in Li by holding
that Congress clearly intended to make priority date retention and automatic
conversion joint benefits. 317 It is certainly possible to understand paragraph
(3) as signifying that if the calculation results in an age of twenty-one years
or older, then “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the
appropriate category” and “the alien shall retain the original priority date
issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 318 It is equally reasonable,
however, to read this paragraph as conferring the two benefits

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

§ 1153(h)(1)–(3).
See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197–98, 208 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
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independently, an analysis that is supported by other family-related
immigration statutes and also within another provision of the CSPA. 319
Even though section 6 of the CSPA, § 1154(k), was passed on the same day
as § 1153(h) and specifically makes conversion and retention independent
benefits, this analogy cannot resolve the unclear language of § 1153(h)(3),
which must be ambiguous because it can be interpreted both ways.
4. The CSPA’s Legislative History Does Not Reveal Congressional Intent
An examination of § 1153(h)(3)’s legislative history does not remedy the
ambiguity of the statute, as demonstrated by its operation and relation to
other statutory provisions. There was no specific discussion by Congress of
particular age-out protections for derivative beneficiaries of family
preference petitions. 320 The report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary and statements by various members of the House of
Representatives express concern over delays in the adjudication process,
rather than the waiting times associated with numerical limitations.321
While Senator Feinstein’s remarks indicate her concern about visa demand
as well as agency delay, she specifically addressed children of LPRs, who
might be beneficiaries or derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions. 322 In
addition, the relatively meager legislative history of the Act does not reveal
a clear congressional intent to increase the number of visas to be allocated
each year. 323 Following the Senate amendment that Senator Feinstein
sponsored, the Act was returned to the House before its enactment, where
again there was no discussion of enlarging the number of visas available to
family-preference immigrants. 324
While § 1153(h)(3)’s text is clear, the provision’s operation, statutory
context, and legislative history are ambiguous. Therefore, it is appropriate
to proceed to Chevron Step Two.
B. Chevron Step Two: The BIA’s Interpretation Is Not Arbitrary
or Capricious
The BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) in Wang is “based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”325 The effect of Wang is to limit
§ 1153(h)(3) to only one petition type: F2A. 326 This is the only petition
with an “appropriate category” to which an aged-out primary or derivative
beneficiary may “automatically be converted” without a change in the
petitioner’s identity. 327 The BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3) does
restrict conversion and retention to aliens who convert from the F2A
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–10, 113, 115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114, 259 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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category, which was already permitted under a preexisting regulation.328
But this regulation says nothing about automatic conversion, nor does it
refer to aged-out primary beneficiaries of F2A petitions. 329 Therefore, the
BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) does result in some change.
In addition, as previously discussed, the BIA’s reasoning corresponds
with the usual practice of the word “automatic,” which describes a process
that occurs without requiring new components. 330 The BIA also construed
“conversion” and “retention” in § 1153(h)(3) consistently with how those
terms have been used in other immigration statutes and regulations related
to family-based preferences. 331
Importantly, the BIA’s decision in Wang does not conflict with
Congress’s stated intent. The CSPA’s legislative history demonstrates that
Congress enacted the statute in order to provide some form of relief to
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of family preference petitions. 332 All
derivative beneficiaries receive age-out protection due to administrative
delays under § 1153(h)(1). 333 As noted earlier, the Act’s House sponsors
referred solely to this protection when they addressed the provisions that the
Senate had added. 334 As the Cuellar de Osorio court observed, “[W]e
cannot say that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) is contrary to
congressional intent simply because it affords additional relief only to
children in the F2A category.” 335
While the legislative record does reflect general congressional statements
about family unity, 336 Congress has in fact often limited preferential
immigration status for aged-out children. 337 As the Supreme Court has
noted on congressional policy decisions,
it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point
and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and
and children who share strong family ties. . . . But it is clear from our
cases . . . that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the
political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority
to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress. 338

If Congress had intended to allow aged-out derivative beneficiaries to
immigrate with or immediately following their parents, it could have
eliminated the complicated formula of § 1153(h)(1) and thus the
controversial conversion procedure of § 1153(h)(3). As an alternative,
328. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 106, 108–10, 115 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
335. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2011).
336. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
337. For example, children cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or
twenty-one years of age or older. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2006); see also supra note 48
and accompanying text (describing the recognized family-based preference categories).
338. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977).
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Congress could have frozen the age of all derivative beneficiaries at a
petition’s filing date, as it did in other sections of the CSPA, 339 or allowed
U.S. citizens and LPRs to directly petition on behalf of their grandchildren,
nieces, and nephews. 340
Limiting § 1153(h)(3)’s applicability to F2A petitions is not arbitrary or
capricious but “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”341
Applying § 1153(h)(3) to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries would
significantly alter the family preference system. 342 This change would
effectively allow aged-out derivatives of F3 and F4 petitions to receive their
own priority dates based on their status as grandchildren, nephews, and
nieces of U.S. citizens. 343 These beneficiaries, as new entrants in line,
would then jump ahead of other aliens who had been waiting for visas for
years. 344 The example of “Rose” and “Alice” and their respective children
demonstrates this potential unfairness.345
Imagine that “Rose” immigrated to the United States in 2000 as the
primary beneficiary of an immediate relative petition. Her then-sixteenyear-old daughter was unable to accompany her because derivative
beneficiary relationships do not apply to immediate relative petitions.346
The following year, Rose filed an F2A petition for her daughter. When she
turned twenty-one in 2005, this petition converted to an F2B petition.
Rose’s daughter is still waiting for her priority date to become current in
order to apply for a visa.
In contrast, “Alice” immigrated to the United States in 1994 as the
beneficiary of an F3 petition. Her then-nineteen-year-old son was listed as
a derivative beneficiary on this petition. When Alice became an LPR
thirteen years later in 2007, however, her son no longer qualified as a
“child.” That year, Alice filed an F2B petition for her then-thirty-two-yearold son. If the original 1994 priority date was applied to the more recent
2007 petition, Alice’s son could immediately receive a visa number.
In 2007, Alice’s thirty-two-year-old son and Rose’s twenty-three-year
old daughter were eligible for F2B visas as adult family members of LPRs.
However, Rose achieved LPR status seven years before Alice and filed her
F2B petition six years before Alice filed hers. Rose and her daughter have
been apart since 2000, but Alice and her son have only been apart since
2007. Alice’s son would effectively be jumping ahead of Rose’s daughter
in line, even though the daughter had been waiting in line in another
category for many more years.
339. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the limits on which relatives
U.S. citizens and LPRs may petition for under current immigration law).
341. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
342. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
345. This example has been slightly modified from the government’s brief in Cuellar de
Osorio. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 63–64, Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 956
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 09-56786, 09-56846).
346. See supra note 54.
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In contrast, the F2A to F2B conversion permitted by the BIA does not
displace other immigrants in each category’s respective visa queue. Here,
the primary or derivative beneficiary in fact transfers from a line with a
reasonably short waiting time to one that is far longer. For example, as of
January 2012, for all countries except Mexico, F2A visas were available for
beneficiaries with priority dates before April 22, 2009, while F2B visas
were available only for priority dates before September 8, 2003.347 Thus,
the wait time for F2B visas was five years longer than the wait time for F2A
visas. 348
By permitting automatic conversion from F2A to F2B,
§ 1153(h)(3) in fact forces the primary and derivative beneficiaries to join a
line with a longer wait time. The beneficiaries are not required to start at
the end of this queue, however, because they are permitted to retain their
original priority dates.
The BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3) does not conflict with
congressional intent, but rather preserves the goals of the family preference
visa system. It is a practical and reasonable policy choice for the agency to
make. Because the agency’s interpretation represents a permissible
construction of the statute at Chevron Step Two, it warrants Chevron
deference. 349
CONCLUSION
Although the plain language of § 1153(h)(3) is unambiguous, the
statutory provision does not allow automatic conversion for F2B, F3, and
F4 petitions. This ambiguity is not remedied through either an assessment
of the statute’s legislative history or whether priority date retention serves
as an independent benefit. As it is impossible to discern congressional
intent at Chevron Step One, it is therefore necessary to proceed to Chevron
Step Two analysis. The BIA’s interpretation of which family preference
petitions are entitled to age-out protection under § 1153(h)(3) of the CSPA
is permissible. Deferral to the BIA, as advocated by the Ninth Circuit in
Cuellar de Osorio, is the correct position. Unless and until Congress
revises the CSPA to clarify what petitions qualify for age-out protection, or
allocates additional family preference visas, courts should follow the
example of the Ninth Circuit and uphold the BIA’s interpretation of
§ 1153(h)(3).

347. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 2. For Mexico and the
Philippines, the difference between the F2A and F2B visa lines was even longer—seventeen
years and eight years, respectively. Id. There is a difference in F2A and F2B waiting times
because, under § 1153(a)(2), at least 77 percent of second preference visas must be allocated
to the F2A category. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
348. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 2.
349. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.

